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INTRODUCTION 
In his "Summary of Argument" Coleman is critical of Street Search for not appealing the 
"vast majority of the trial court's interlocutory rulings or orders," and then painstakingly cites to 
many of these orders or rulings from which Street Search did not appeal. Why? Coleman also 
criticizes Street Search for not appealing "the jury verdict," but fails to identify how that is 
relevant. If the Court grants any of the relief Street Search seeks on Appeal, the Appellants 
would be entitled to a new trial or dismissal of the case altogether. 
On page 3 of Coleman's Brief: he also points out that Street Search has not argued every 
issue it cited in its Notices of Appeal. Obviously, it was Street Search's intent to narrow those 
issues and argue the issues for which it believed it had the f,'Teatest chance of success. If Street 
Search did not identify an issue in its Blief, then logically it follows it was not pursuing that 
issue on appeal. However, on page 9 of his Brief, Coleman then "restates the issues" and 
identifies the issues Street Search chose not to pursue on Appeal. Again, why? 
Then, in the majority of its response arguments, Coleman asserts Street Search has not 
cited to authority or presented argument, and repeatedly cites to City of Meridian v. Petra Inc., 
154 Idaho 425, 299 P.3d 232 (2013). ("The Court 'will not consider issues cited on appeal that 
are not supported by propositions oflaw, authority or argument' .") In many instances, however, 
Coleman's claim that Street Search has not presented argument or citation is Coleman's only 
counterargument. If Street Search has in fact cited to authority or provided argument, and 
Coleman's only response is Street Search has not, then Coleman has waived any other 
counterarguments regarding these issues. Simply arguing a party has not cited to authority nor 
Appellants' Reply Brief, p. 5 
presented argument as a sole response to an issue raised on appeal therefore would appear to be a 
risky proposition? 
Notwithstanding Coleman's unfounded criticism, in many respects, his Brief appears to 
be a draft copy. As an example, in the heading on the first page, Coleman misidentifies himself 
and his companies as "counterclaimants." Coleman then misidentifies the Defendants as 
"Counterdefendants. " 
REBUTTAL ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial Court Erred When it Denied Appellants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of 
Personal Jurisdiction 
A. Coleman Failed to Establish the Appellants "Fall Under" Idaho's Long Arm Statue 
While Coleman cites to the broad language of I.e. § 5-514 and claims Podesta's conduct 
while in Idaho meets the definition of "conducting business," Coleman fails to identify facts to 
establish the "causation" element of a long arm statute claim. 
The exercise of personal jurisdiction by the cOUlis of this state over those who do 
any ofthe acts enumerated in I.C. § 5-514 extends only "as to any cause of 
action arising from the doing of any of said acts." This is "specific" as 
distinguished from "general" jurisdiction. 
Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 85, 803 P.2d 978,981 (1990), quoting I.e. § 
5-514 1• (Emphasis added). 
1 5-514. ACTS SUBJECTING PERSONS TO JURISDICTION OF COURTS OF STATE. Any 
person, finn, company, association or corporation, whether or not a citizen or resident of this 
state, who in person or through an agent does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated, thereby 
submits said person, finn, company, association or corporation, and if an individual, his personal 
representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any cause of action arising 
from the doing of any of said acts: .... 
Appellants' Reply Brief, p. 6 
Accordingly, Coleman must establish, either in his Verified Complaint or in Coleman's 
affidavit, that Podesta's conduct in Idaho gave rise to those causes of action raised by Coleman. 
Unfortunately, however, Coleman still has failed to answer the simple, yet foundational question; 
Just what did Podesta do while Podesta was in Idaho for 24 hours that gave rise to any cause of 
action? 
There are three documents relevant to the Court's analysis; the Verified Complaint,2 
(R. p. 25-30), the Affidavit of Jeff Podesta, (R. p. 36-43), and the Affidavit of Robert Coleman, 
(R. p. 52-69.). In his Verified Complaint, Coleman seeks a declaratory jud!:,lffient that no 
contract exists with Podesta or Street Search, and if a contract did exist, it was an independent 
contractor agreement, which Coleman ultimately terminated. 
In his Verified Complaint, Coleman avers generally that " ... Street Search and Jeff 
Podesta have traveled to and conducted business in Ada County and Canyon County, Idaho 
during 2009. (R. p. 26.) However, Coleman neither states any facts identifying just what 
"business" Street Search or Podesta was conducting, nor how that conduct lead to Coleman's 
causes of action. 
Podesta's physical presence in Idaho for 24 hours is not enough to invoke jurisdiction. 
"Mere personal presence in Idaho at one time is not sufficient in and of itself to form the basis 
for the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over a person who is later served with process 
2 As the Defendants argued in their Memorandum In Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, R. p. 44-
51, Coleman was named merely as a "straw man" in the hopes of establishing jurisdiction in Idaho. The 
Plaintiffs failed to name Coleman personally in any claim or it their prayer for relief. Had the Court 
entered Default Judgment, Coleman was entitled to no relief. 
Appellants' Reply Brief, p. 7 
outside the state." Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 91, 803 P.2d 978, 987 
(1990). 
Podesta testified in his affidavit filed in support of his Motion to Dismiss that Coleman 
contacted Podesta in New Jersey and solicited Podesta's involvement in Coleman's business. 
(R. p. 37, Affidavit, para. 4.) "Mr. Coleman contacted me; I did not contact him in Idaho nor 
solicit any business relationship with Mr. Coleman or his companies in Idaho." Podesta also 
testified he was in Idaho for one day in 2009, and was there at "Mr. Coleman's request:' 
(R. p. 38, Affidavit, para. 10.) Podesta also states his claim was based on "the promised 50% 
ownership in a Delaware limited partnership, not on any claim of ownership in Profits Plus 
Capital Management, LLC." (R. p. 39, Affidavit, para. 16.) Podesta also denies he solicited any 
investors during his single 24-hour visit to Idaho. (R. p. 38, Affidavit, para. 11.). 
In response to Podesta's affidavit, Coleman filed an affidavit in which he generally 
restates what he alleged in his Verified Complaint. However, Coleman did not dispute Podesta's 
testimony that Coleman contacted Podesta in New Jersey or that Podesta traveled to Idaho "at 
Coleman's request." Coleman also failed to identifY any investors located in Idaho that Podesta 
allegedly contacted while he was in Idaho for 24 hours. 
Then, in paragraphs 18, 19,20 and 21 of Coleman's affidavit he lists activities he claims 
Podesta performed while in Idaho during his 24-hour stay, or soon thereafter from New Jersey, 
that Coleman claimed constituted "conducting business in Idaho." Coleman claimed in this 
affidavit that Podesta was in Idaho workingfor Dollars and Sense and Profits Plus. (R. p. 55-56.) 
(Emphasis added.) 
Appellants' Reply Brief, p. 8 
Coleman must establish something that Podesta or Street Search did to Coleman or his 
companies while in Idaho that gave rise to Coleman's claims. If Podesta was "conducting 
business on behalf of Dollars and Sense and Profits Plus," then what cause of action arose from 
Podesta's alleged conduct? Any interactions Podesta had with other people in Idaho are 
ilTelevant unless that conduct gave rise to a claim. However, no one Coleman identifies in his 
Affidavit has made any claim against Podesta or Street Search. 
Coleman does not allege that while Podesta was in Idaho they negotiated any contractual 
agreements or that any alleged contract was consummated in Idaho. Moreover, Coleman seeks a 
declaratory judgment finding that no contract existed. Ifthere was no contract as Coleman 
alleges, than nothing Podesta did in Idaho gave rise to a contractual relationship. In the 
alternative, Coleman claims if there was an agreement, it was an independent contractor 
relationship only. Again, however, Coleman fails to allege any facts that anything Podesta did 
while in Idaho related to the creation or breach of any contract. 
Both the Trial Court below and the Respondents now on appeal place great emphasis on 
the fact that the Fund is allegedly an Idaho-based business. Coleman cites to the Court's ruling 
on page 15 of Coleman's brief, where it is clear the Court based its decision, in part, on the fact 
that the LP was physically located here in Idaho. However, the Hoagland Farms Court ruled the 
plaintiff's principle place of business in Idaho "has no significance." 
The fact that HFI's principal place of business was in Idaho has no significance in 
determining whether Idaho may exercise personal jurisdiction over Johnson. It is 
Johnson's activities, not HFl's location that must be considered. 
Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 81, 803 P.2d 978,987 (1990). 
Appellants' Reply Brief, p. 9 
Additionally, while Coleman quotes the Trial Court on page 15 of his Brief, it is clear 
that the Trial Court is considering Podesta's counterclaims when it denied Podesta's second 
motion to dismiss. The counterclaims were only filed after the Court denied Podesta's motion to 
dismiss. As discussed below, Podesta did not waive his objection to jurisdiction by filing a 
counterclaim. It therefore was error for the Trial Court to consider the Plaintiffs' physical 
locations or Podesta's counterclaims as a basis for personal jurisdiction. 
B. Coleman Failed to Establish that Either Podesta or Street Search had the Requisite 
"Minimum Contacts" with Idaho 
Podesta did not purposefully avail himself of the privilege of conducting activities within 
Idaho. Podesta was in Idaho for a single 24-hour period at Coleman 's request and based on 
Coleman's promises of an equity interest in a Delaware Limited Partnership. Consequently, 
Coleman failed to establish a constitutional basis for Idaho to assert jurisdiction over either 
Podesta or Street Search. 
The Supreme Court in Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 803 P.2d 978 
(1990), discussed and adopted the reasoning in several federal cases that addressed the minimum 
contacts standards. 
The leading case involving a contract dispute is the recent Burger King Corp. v. 
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985) .... 
Reviewing prior cases, Justice Brennan reasoned that the minimum contacts 
required by International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 
L.Ed. 95 (1945), are supplied if the defendant "purposefully directs" his 
activities at residents of the forum state and the litigation arises out of or relates 
to those activities. Id. 105 S.Ct. at 2182. In contracts cases, those who reach out 
beyond one state and create continuing relationships and obligations with 
Appellants' Reply Brief, p. 10 
citizens of another state are subject to suit in the other state for the 
consequences of their activities. Id. (Emphasis added.) 
Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72,86,803 P.2d 978,982 (1990). 
If there was no agreement, as Coleman claims in his declaratory judgment action, 
entitling Street Search to 50% general partner interest in the now named Street Search Fund, then 
just why did Podesta travel to Idaho? If Podesta was in Idaho as an "independent contractor," 
there is no dispute that Podesta was in Idaho at Coleman's request. In the alternative, it there 
was an agreement as Colman concedes in Exhibit E, then Podesta was in Idaho believing, based 
on Coleman's promise of equity, that he had an ownership interest in the Fund that contained the 
name of his company, Street Search. As the facts are undisputed that Podesta was in Idaho at 
Coleman's request, and based on a belief created by Coleman, then Podesta did not "reach out" 
to or "purposefully direct" any activities at any resident of Idaho. A finding that either Podesta 
or Street Search was subject to personal jurisdiction in Idaho was therefore error. 
Again, Coleman cites to the Court's ruling on page 15 of Coleman's brief, where it is 
clear the Court based its decision, in part, on the fact that the LP was physically located here in 
Idaho. That was error based on the ruling that for jurisdictional purposes the principle place of 
business in Idaho "has no significance." Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 81, 
803 P.2d 978,987 (1990). While the Trial Court stated it was basing jurisdiction because 
Podesta was claiming an "ownership" interest in an Idaho company, that conclusion ignores the 
undisputed fact the only reason Podesta was in Idaho was based on Coleman's promise of that 
Appellants' Reply Brief, p. 11 
interest. Moreover, merely claiming an "interest" in a company allegedly "based" in Idaho does 
not in and of itself invoke jurisdiction. 
Coleman then entirely ignores Podesta's "purposeful availmenC arguments; undoubtedly 
because Coleman has no factual response. Coleman had to establish the basis for Podesta's 
"contacts with the forum" were vo/untaly and resulted from "his own actions," and not the result 
of Coleman's actions. (Appellants' Briefp. 17, citing Roth v. Garcia Marquez, 942 F.2d 617,621 
(9th Cir. 1991)) However, as argued above, Coleman did not deny he contacted Podesta while 
Podesta was in New Jersey, or that Podesta traveled to Idaho "at Coleman's request." (R. p. 38, 
Affidavit, para. 10.) Contrary to the Trial Court's ruling, it is patently "unfair," and violates due 
process for Idaho to assert jurisdiction when the only reason Podesta was ever in Idaho was 
based on promises of a contractual relationship by the Plaintiffs, and based on Coleman's request 
that Podesta travel to Idaho. 
C. Coleman Failed to Establish Jurisdiction in Idaho was "Reasonable" 
Coleman also fails to state any reason that Idaho, as the "forum" state, would have any 
interest in adjudicating a claim that involved a Delaware LP and a Delaware limited liability 
versus a New Jersey resident and a New Jersey Limited Liability Company, when the Delaware 
partnership and LLC have been operating in Idaho for at least ten years without lawfully 
registering as foreign companies in Idaho. Podesta has proven that neither Defendant Profits 
Plus nor Defendant Dollars and Sense were lawfully registered in Idaho as foreign entities at any 
time relevant to his lawsuit. If Coleman did not register his companies as required by law in 
Idaho, why should Idaho assert jurisdiction? 
Appellants' Reply Brief, p. 12 
Coleman criticizes Street Search's contention that Delaware is the more appropriate 
forum for this action and argues, "[t]he principle place of business for the LP is in Idaho, that 
Robert Coleman is an Idaho resident, and Profits Plus is an Idaho limited liability company, ... , 
and that the LP is regulated by the Idaho Department of Finance." (Respondents' Briet~ p. 19.) 
However, these facts are either irrelevant or wrong. First, as quoted above, for jurisdictional 
purposes, the principle place of business in Idaho is of "no consequence." Second, as Street 
Search argued in its original motion to dismiss, Coleman is merely a straw man, named for 
jurisdictional purposes only. (R. p. 45.) There are no allegations nor any claim for relief in the 
Verified Complaint that involve Coleman. Third, Profits Plus is a Delaware Limited Liability 
Company, which Coleman finally registered as a foreign LLC in Idaho in April, 2010, although 
he had been doing business in Idaho for 10 years. Finally, the Street Search Dollars and Sense 
Fund, LP and its successor, the Dollars and Sense Fund, LP is an exempt security filed under 
Regulation D. Coleman formed the LP in Delaware, and again, until recently had not registered 
the LP as a Foreign Limited Partnership in Idaho. The Idaho Department of Finance does not 
"regulate" the fund in any manner as it is exempt from registration. Based on these facts, what 
interest does Idaho have in asserting jurisdiction to protect two companies who disregarded 
Idaho law for so long? 
Appellants' Reply Brief, p. 13 
D. Street Search and Podesta did Not Waive Personal Jurisdiction by Filing Counterclaims 
Initially, the Defendants filed a special appearance to contest personal jurisdiction 
according to I.R.C.P. 4(i).3 Coleman now argues that I.R.C.P. 4(i) does not, "permit the filing of 
an affirmative counterclaim without constituting a voluntary appearance.,,4 Coleman then cites to 
Grange Ins. Assoc. v. State, 110 Wash.2d 752, 757 P.2d 933 (1998). 
During the post-trial hearing on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Podesta, Coleman's 
counsel represented to the Court he had researched the waiver issue and had identified several 
cases from other jurisdictions holding that a party waived jurisdiction by filing a counterclaim. 
14. MR. GOURLEY: I wish I could cite the court 
15. to an Idaho case because I couldn't find any. I 
16. did research, and I can provide them to the court. 
17. I found them in Washington, Arizona, Ohio, or 
18. Florida cases that are all holding when you seek 
19. affirmative relief you waive your -- your special 
20. appearance and limitation to -- for personal 
21. jurisdiction. 
Tr. of Motion to Dismiss Podesta, March 28,2012, p. 279. 
Notwithstanding Mr. Gourley's representation to the Trial Court that he could not locate 
an Idaho case, there is Idaho precedent directly on point. 
The next question is whether the counterclaim filed with the answer, seeking 
a judgment against Nelson for the deficiency due under the lease contract, 
constitutes a waiver of jurisdiction. A counterclaim is compulsory "if it arises 
out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing 
party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties 
of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction." I.R.C.P. 13(a). The counterclaim 
3 A copy ofthis Notice is in the Clerk's Record according to the Court's Order Granting Motion to 
Augment the Record and Request for Judicial Notice of Public Records, entered July 29,2013. 
4 Respondents' Brief, p. 20. 
Appellants' Reply Brief, p. 14 
in this case is compulsory, because it arose out of the lease transaction which is 
the subject matter of a portion of Nelson's complaint. The preferred rule is that 
a compulsory counterclaim does not waive jurisdictional defenses. 5 C. 
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1397 
(1969). See also Dragor Shipping Corporation v. Union Tank Car Company, 378 
F.2d 241 (9th Cir.1967); ANNOT., 17 A.L.R. FED. 388 (1973). We hold that 
World Wide did not waive its jurisdictional objection by filing a compulsory 
counterclaim. 
Nelson v. World Wide Lease, Inc., 110 Idaho 369, 372, 716 P.2d 513,516 (Ct. App. 1986). 
(Emphasis Added.) 
There is no question that Street Search's counterclaims were compulsory as they arose 
out or the same "transaction or occurrence" which was the basis of the Complaint. Coleman was 
named as a Counterdefendant as he was named as a party plaintiff, although without any basis, in 
the Verified Complaint. 
Then. notwithstanding Mr. Gourley's representation to the Court that he had thoroughly 
researched this issue and knew of numerous cases in other jurisdictions to support his argument, 
Coleman only cites to one case; Grange Ins. Assoc. v. State, 110 Wash.2d 752, 757 P.2d 933) 
(1998), in his brief. Upon review of the Grange Ins. case, however, that case did not involve a 
compulsory counterclaim or any ruling related to such a pleading. 
Additionally, the clear language ofLR.C.P. 4(i), when read in conjunction with LR.C.P. 
8( a)( 1) establishes that once a party has raised a proper objection to jurisdiction, but loses that 
fight, the party does not waive his jurisdictional objection, even when he files a counterclaim. 
LR.C.P.4(i) 
(2) Motion or Special Appearance to Contest Personal Jurisdiction. A motion 
under Rule 12(b )(2), (4) or (5), whether raised before or after judgment, a motion 
under Rule 40(d)(1) or (2), or a motion for an extension of time to answer or 
otherwise appear does not constitute a voluntary appearance by the party under 
this rule. The joinder of other defenses in a motion under Rule 12(b)(2), (4) or (5) 
Appellants' Reply Brief, p. 15 
does not constitute a voluntary appearance by the party under this rule. After a 
party files a motion under Rule 12(b )(2), (4) or (5), action taken by that party in 
responding to discovery or to a motion filed by another party does not constitute a 
voluntary appearance. If, after a motion under Rule 12(b )(2), (4), or (5) is denied, 
the party pleads further and defends the action, such further appearance and 
defense of the action will not constitute a voluntary appearance under this 
rule. The filing of a document entitled "special appearance," which does not seek 
any relief but merely provides notice that the party is entering a special 
appearance to contest personal jurisdiction, does not constitute a voluntary 
appearance by the party under this rule if the party files a motion under Rule 
12(b)(2), (4), or (5) within fourteen (14) days after filing such document, or 
within such later time as the court permits. (Emphasis added.) 
LR.C.P. 4(i)(2) does not specify when a party files an "answer," it says when the paIiy 
"pleads further. ... " I.R.c.P. 8(a)(l), identifies that a counterclaim is a "pleading." "A pleading 
which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-
party claim, .... " 
Unquestionably, the burden is on the Plaintiff to select the proper forum. If a Defendant 
timely objects to jurisdiction, but is subject to an erroneous ruling concerning personal 
jurisdiction, how it is inequitable, if the Defendant has preserved the objection to jurisdiction, to 
allow the Defendant to raise a counterclaim as he is essentially trapped in that forum? A ruling 
to the contrary would award Plaintiffs who file where jurisdiction is ultimately deemed not to 
exist. 
Moreover, once again, it appears from the Court's statements memorialized on page 15 of 
the Respondent's briefthat the Court is considering the allegations in Podesta and Street 
Search's counterclaims as a basis for personal jurisdiction. Those allegations are irrelevant as 
they were raised after the Court refused to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 
Appellants' Reply Brief, p. 16 
II. Trial Court Abused its Discretion When it Denied the Appellants' Motion for New 
Trial 
For the past several years, the Idaho Supreme Court has been reviewing case processing 
time standards with the goal of expeditious case processing and disposition. To accomplish this 
goal, the COUli must require the parties to provide full, complete and accurate discovery 
responses in a timely manner. Conversely, a weak stance on I.R.c.P. 26(e) violations 
undermines the Court's intended purpose to expedite the trial process. Undoubtedly, allowing 
and condoning dilatory or evasive conduct during the discovery phase of litigation will do 
nothing to expedite the Supreme Court's goal. The COUli must therefore place the responsibility 
on the responding party to provide complete and accurate discovery responses. If there is a 
question as to the scope of the request, then the responding party must raise that issue before trial 
or suffer the consequences by its no-disclosure, even when that non-disclosure is discovered after 
trial. 
Street Search and Podesta cited to I.R.C.P. 26(e) and argued that the Trial Court abused 
its discretion when it placed the burden on them to pursue a motion to compel discovery even 
when Coleman and his counsel had verified under oath that the discovery responses they had 
provided were accurate. Somewhat amazingly, Coleman never even mentions LR.C.P. 26(e) in 
his Brief. 
After considering the parties' arguments related to Street Search's Motion for New Trial, 
the Courts stated: 
Had someone come to me during the course of the litigation and said, Judge, I 
asked for this stuff. [Coleman's e-mails and the IDOF file.] It's within the scope 
Appellants' Reply Brief, p. 17 
of my request, and they didn't produce anything from the Department of Finance. 
Make them produce it. And the other side says, no, it's not within, it's beyond the 
scope, I would have said produce it. 
(Mot. To Supp. the Record, Tr. p. 106, L. 21-25, P. 107, LL. 1-4.) (Emphasis added.) 
In his Brief: Coleman contends, "Respondents believed they had provided all infonnation 
required by Appellants, especially given the fact that the Appellants had actually provided less 
infonnation in response to a nearly identical request for production." (Appellants' Brief, p. 27.) 
However, this statement is unjustifiable and disingenuous in two respects. 
First, there is no factual basis to conclude Coleman or counsel did not understand the 
request included documents from the IDOF. Coleman's counsel identified Coleman as an Expert 
Witness regarding securities rules and regulations, including licensing requirements. Coleman 
specifically professed to be an "expert" in securities licensing. 
In addition, Robert Coleman will testifY as an expert witness as to standards in the 
industry for compensation of officers and third parties relating to hedge funds and 
hedge fund transactions, valuing hedge funds, registration of hedge funds, 
licensing requirements for individuals and entities involved with hedge funds 
and compensation that can be paid to individuals and entities relating to hedge 
fund transactions and management services. (Coleman's Expert Witness 
Disclosure, R. p. 284.) (Emphasis added.) 
Then, Coleman testified at trial he and Profits Plus were licensed in Idaho as "Registered 
Investment Advisors," and that he possessed the requisite securities licenses necessary for 
licensing as a Registered Investment Advisor in Idaho. (Vol. 1, p. 445, L. 2, to p. 466, L. 6.) 
Based on Coleman's professed expertise of securities licensing, and specifically the licensing 
requirement in Idaho, it is incredible for Coleman to assert that he provided all of the documents 
he believed were responsive to this request. For this to be true, Coleman would have to have 
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ignored and disregarded when he considered his response to RFP. 27, what he had confirmed and 
acknowledged under oath during the trial; that the IDOF was the licensing authority for 
Coleman's Registered Investment Advisor license. As Coleman acknowledged and confirmed 
the IDOF was his licensing agency, and RFP. 27 refers to Coleman and Profit Plus's securities 
licenses, then Coleman and his Counsel had to have known Coleman's IDOF file was responsive 
to RFP. 27. Any conclusion to the contrary does not result from the exercise of reason. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO 27. Please provide a copy of each 
and every document relating to the issuance of any professional broker and/or 
securities licenses to Robert Coleman or Profits Plus the revocation and/or 
suspension of any such licenses and the reinstatement if applicable of any 
such licenses. 
Moreover, Coleman is impeached by his own conduct. Obviously, the most compelling 
evidence Coleman knew his IDOF file was responsive to this request are Coleman's own e-mails 
to the IDOF in which he requests a complete copy of his file. CR. p. 847.) If Coleman or his 
Counsel did not believe the IDOF file was responsive to this Request, then why did Coleman 
request the file from the IDOF before trial and while discovery was ongoing? Coleman failed to 
provide a satisfactory response to this question to the Trial Court or to this Court on appeal. This 
evidence confirms that Coleman and counsel considered RFP. 27 as it applied to Coleman's 
IDOF file, and after determining the files were responsive but that Podesta could not reach the 
files through a public records request, purposefully and intentionally refused to obtain these 
records and disclose them through discovery. 
Coleman's and his counsel's feigned ignorance is also disingenuous as Coleman knew 
and contested ad nausea that Podesta was required to be licensed as a Registered Investment 
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Advisor in Idaho, because Coleman knew Podesta was not so licensed. As Coleman knew 
Podesta was not licensed in Idaho, why would Coleman expect Podesta to provide any IDOF 
records when Coleman knew none existed? It is a specious argument at best to claim under these 
circumstances that Coleman did not provide his IDOF file because neither had Podesta. 
By ruling it would have granted a motion to compel the IDOF file and Coleman's e-mails 
to and from the IDOF, the Trial Court is stating a reasonable person should have know those 
documents were responsive to RFP. 27. If as the Trial Court ruled the e-mails and IDOF file 
were responsive, then Coleman and counsel violated the duty imposed by LR.C.P. 26(e) by 
failing to supplement their verified responses. Any ruling to the contrary is an abuse of 
discretion. 
Finally, the Respondents insult the Court's intelligence by continuing to claim that 
nothing Coleman said at trial was anything less than "honest and accurate." (Respondents' Brief, 
p.26.) It is undisputed that Coleman requested and then withdrew the request for his entire 
IDOF file, so how is it accurate to testify, "I have a clean and honest record"? Moreover, 
Marilyn Chastain refused to confirm, as Coleman requested, IDOF's audits and examinations of 
Coleman and Profits Plus "were concluded satisfactorily." (Coleman'S draft affidavit submitted 
to Ms. Chastain in which she edited and removed the proposed language "All examinations were 
concluded satisfactorily to the Department." (R. p. 66, para. 6.)) Accordingly, Coleman has no 
basis to justify his contention, "Similarly, the statement that Mr. Coleman has never had a 
'regulatory authority in any way sanction [him], fine [him], suspend [him] in anything" remains 
undisputedly accurate," (Respondents' Brief, P. 26.), while refusing to disclose records of 
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IOOF's audits and examinations which the IDOF states Coleman did not "conclude 
satisfactorily." Again, it is hard to imagine that Coleman would have had much credibility with 
the Jury if they had know despite his testimony above Coleman did not know what was in his 
IOOF file and purposefully had refused to disclose that file. 
Just what is in Coleman's IDOF file? We do not know because he refused to produce it 
before trial or to the Trial Court in response to Podesta's Motion for New Trial. If Coleman's 
IOOF file is innocuous and supports his contentions, then why did Coleman refuse to disclose its 
contents? 
Finally, how is justice served, under these circumstances, to allow Coleman to keep a 
verdict he obtained by failing to disclose relevant documents requested through discovery and 
then exploiting that non-disclosure to his advantage at trial? Then, having violated LR.C.P. 
26( e) before trial, how is justice served by disregarding this violation when the violation is 
discovered after trial? 
III. The Trial Court Abused its Discretion When it Excluded Defendants' Exhibit E 
A. Street Search was Not Required to Offer Exhibit E at Trial in Light of the Court's 
Pre-Trial Ruling to Exclude this Exhibit 
Coleman cites no authority to support his argument that requires a party to attempt to 
offer evidence at trial that has been excluded by a motion in limine, in order to preserve appellate 
review of the motion in limine ruling. No such authority exists. Why would a party who is 
ordered not to offer evidence at trial as a result of a motion in limine have to offer evidence to 
preserve an objection on appeal? That would be nonsensical and undermine the very purpose of 
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a motion in limine. Moreover, as cited by Coleman in the footnote on p. 30 of his Brief, the Trial 
Court reiterated its ruling during the trial the Court was not going to admit Exhibit E. 
The Court also excluded Exhibit H5 pursuant to the Motion in Limine,6 but then allowed 
a portion of the redacted version at trial. In a footnote on page 30 of the Respondents' Brief, 
they cite to an exchange between Appellants' counsel and the Court regarding Exhibit E, when 
Counsel was seeking to offer Exhibit H. The Court reiterated it was not going to allow Exhibit E 
into evidence at trial. Obviously, Appellants' counsel misspoke in this exchange which the 
Court acknowledged by disagreeing with Counsel. ("[The Court] It looks an awful lot like an 
offer to compromise a disputed matter to me, Mr. Clark." (Vol. 2, p. 735, L. 8-9.)) 
B. Coleman Ignores Street Search's Argument Coleman was Attempting to Modify an 
Existing Contract, Not Reach a Settlement 
Notwithstanding that Street Search cites to LR.E. 408 and argues from the facts that 
Coleman was not attempting any settlement, but seeking to extort a contract modification, 
Coleman argues this Court should disregard this argument and cites once again to City of 
Meridian. However, Coleman offers no substantive response or counterart,JUment. 
How broadly is the Court going to define "settlement negotiations"? Do the facts have to 
establish the parties intended to compromise their claims and enter into dialog for this purpose, 
or do "settlement negotiations" include a situation where one party it attempting to extort a 
5 On page 32 of his Brief, Coleman claims, "[t]o the extent Appellants now challenge the Redaction of 
Exhibit H, Appellants do not direct the Court to any portion of the record or Exhibit H that they contend 
the trial court erroneously excluded. However, Street Search provided copies of both the redacted and un-
redacted versions of Exhibit H, (Brief Exhibits 7 and 8) and specifically cited to the excluded language on 
page 32 ofthe Appellants' Brief. 
6 The Court's ruling is in the record at Vol. l,p. 161,top.170,1. 18. 
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concession and the other party is simply crying "foul" and has no intent on negotiating a 
settlement or to compromise anything. Clearly, the facts of this case establish the latter situation. 
Applying LR.E. 408 under these circumstances does nothing to promote the "sanctity" of 
settlement negotiations, because no settlement negotiations were occurring. Again, allowing 
Coleman to hide behind I.R.E. 408, and then lie to the jury does nothing to promote justice. 
C. Where is Coleman's Valuable Consideration? 
Coleman claims Street Search's "assertion that 'Coleman offered no valuable 
consideration" "is not supported by any citation to the record or authority" and again cites to City 
of Meridian. (Respondents' Brief, p. 31.) However, perhaps it would have been a more 
compelling argument for Coleman to identify just what he believed he was offering in Exhibit E 
as "valuable consideration." 
Street Search cited to LR.E. 408 as the basis and cited to the record by presenting the 
very language in Exhibit E which confirmed Coleman was offering nothing more than he 
admitted he was obligated to pay Podesta. As Street Search argued previously, an obligation 
Coleman concedes he owed to Podesta; the payment of management and incentive fees stated in 
Exhibit E, is not valid consideration. 
The bona fide dispute requirement arose from the long-standing rule that payment 
ofless than the amount due on an undisputed, liquidated claim could not 
constitute a valid accord and satisfaction unless such settlement was supported by 
some consideration other than the partial payment. Id. § 28. The rule was based 
on the doctrine that a promise to perform something one has a pre-existing 
legal obligation to do is not adequate consideration to support a contract. 
Shore v. Peterson, 146 Idaho 903, 909, 204 P.3d 1114, 1120 (2009). 
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D. The Trial Court's Error was Patently Prejudicial to Podesta and Street Search 
Coleman's contention that Excluding Exhibit Hand E was harmless is nonsensical. 
Exhibit E is written confirmation by Coleman that he understood a contract existed and that it 
was well beyond that of an independent contractor relationship. Accordingly, Exhibit E 
impeached Coleman's credibility while confirming Podesta's version of the relationship. Exhibit 
H also impeached Coleman's testimony that he was terminating the relationship because Podesta 
did not have what Coleman claimed were the requisite securities licenses. However, in the 
portion of Exhibit H that the Trial Court excluded, Coleman states he wants to continue to work 
with Podesta. 7 Moreover, the Appellants were directed by the Motion in Limine not even to 
mention Coleman's attempt to modify the existing contract with Podesta in as stated in Exhibit 
E. It is therefore patently false when Coleman represents to this Court that other exhibits 
"contain similar or duplicative statements." If that were true, then why did Coleman move to 
exclude Exhibits Hand E, and not the other exhibits? 
IV. The Trial Court Committed Plain Error When it Dismissed the Appellants' Fraud and 
Constructive Fraud Claims 
Coleman begins his argument citing to Street Search's Notices of Appeal and arguing 
Street Search somehow waived this issue because it did not specify this particular issue in its 
Notices. The argument ignores the plain language of LA.R. 17(f), which indicates the "issues" 
listed in the Notice of Appeal are "preliminary," and nothing prevents the Appellant from 
"asserting other issues on appeal." Contrary to this baseless argument, Street Search properly 
7 Exhibit H, (Brief Exhibits 7 and 8). 
Appellants' Reply Brief, p. 24 
raised this issue on appeal, as on page 12 of Appellants' Brief: it states under the heading, Issues 
Presented on Appeal; '"4. Whether the Trial Court committed plain error when it dismissed 
Street Search's fraud and constructive fraud claims?" 
Coleman also criticizes Street Search for relying on "Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants' 
Proposed Jury Instructions for fraud and constructive fraud." (Respondents' Brief, p. 34, footnote 
No. 13.) As Coleman proposed IDJI instructions related to Street Search's fraud and 
constructive fraud claims, and those copies were sufficient for Street Search, then just why 
would Street Search need to burden the Trial Court by providing additional copies of the same 
instructions? Street Search timely gave notice to the Trial Court that it was not objecting to 
some of Coleman's jury instructions, including Coleman's proposed Instructions Nos. 40, 42, 
and 43. (R. p. 597.) 
It appears Coleman simply does not understand Street Search's argument on this issue. 
As clearly stated in the Appellants' Brief, the arguments are simple. A trial court cannot 
summarily dismiss a parties' claim by refusing to give a jury instruction, and then be entitled to 
deference for that decision on appeal. That would constitute plain error. Accordingly, LR.C.P. 
51 (b) is unconstitutional if applied to allow a court to weigh the evidence and summarily dismiss 
a parties' claim and then to afford a deferential review of that decision. 
A. The Trial Court did Not Make the Requisite Record 
Street Search cites to LR.C.P. 51(a)(l) and argues this Rule is mandatory and requires the 
Trial Court, not counsel, to make an appropriate record if the Trial Court is not going to give a 
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particular jury instruction. In his Brief, Coleman restates the obvious, and the very reason 
l.R.C.P. Sl(a)(l) exists. 
It is all but impossible to recall what occurred during a pretrial [sic] in January 
[sic] of2012, and the reasons that the Court stated it declined to instruct the jury 
upon Appellant's claims for fraud and constructive fraud. (Respondent's Brief, p. 
37.) 
However, Coleman simply ignores the clear language ofLR.C.P. Sl(a)(l) and provides 
no argument as to why this rule does not apply. In fact, Coleman never even mentions I.R.C.P. 
S1(a)(1) in his Blief. As Street Search argued, had the Trial Court complied with the mandatory 
requirements ofI.R.C.P. Sl(a)(1), then there would be that record. "The court shall rule upon 
such requests at the close of the evidence at the trial and shall verbally indicate its ruling on 
the record or shall indorse upon the duplicate copy of each requested instruction 
the court's ruling as to such request in the blanks provided .... " LR.C.P. S1(a)(l). (Emphasis 
Added.) Judge Greenwood stated he had not indorsed any proposed instructions, so the Court 
was required to make a verbal record of its decision not to instruct the jury. We have no record 
because the Trial Court failed to follow the mandatory directives in I.R.C.P. Sl(a)(l). 
B. I.R.c.P. Sl(b) Does Not Provide Authority for a Trial Court to Weigh Evidence and 
Dismiss a Claim 
Coleman ignores the reality there is no difference between the situation when a Trial 
Court weighs evidence and refuses to give an element jury instruction, and when a trial court 
weighs evidence in response to a motion for summary judgment when the non-moving party has 
requested a jury trial. The effect is the same; the judge has interjected himself as the trier of fact, 
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which results in the denial of the right to a jury trial. Accordingly, LR.C.P. 5l(b) cannot apply 
when doing so results in the Trial Judge substituting as the jury. 
Moreover, there is no indication that the Supreme Court intended to supplant or overrule 
LR.C.P. 5l(a)(1), when it added LR.C.P. 5l(b). Consequently, these rules must be given effect 
and interpreted as operating in harmony. The Court must therefore consider both of these rules, 
not ignore LR.C.P. 5l(a)(1) as Coleman did in his Brief. 
Again, Coleman provides no substantive arguments against Street Search's contention 
that LR.C.P. 51 (b) is unconditional if applied to provide authority for a Trial Judge to effectively 
dismiss a claim and then to afford deference to that decision on appeal. Coleman simply cites to 
City of Meridian and once again claims Street Search has presented no authority, or argument as 
Coleman's sole response argument. 
C. Street Search Presented Facts Supporting Each Element of its Fraud and Constructive 
Fraud Claims 
Street Search is not asking this Court to "weigh the evidence,,8 on appeal, as Coleman 
argues; Street Search is asking the Appellate Court to apply the proper standard for review of a 
directed verdict as stated in Enriquez v. Idaho Power Co., 152 Idaho 562, 565, 272 P.3d 534, 357 
(2012), ("In conducting this review, 'we determine whether there was sufficient evidence to justify 
submitting the claim to the jury, viewing as true all adverse evidence and drawing every legitimate 
inference in favor of the party opposing the motion for a directed verdict' ."), and Vendelin v. Costco 
Wholesale COlp., 140 Idaho 416, 430, 95 P.3d 34, 48 (2004), ( ..... this Court 'must determine 
whether, admitting the truth of the adverse evidence and drawing every legitimate inference most 
8 Respondents' Brief, p. 37. 
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favorably to the opposing pmiy, there exists substantial evidence to justify submitting the case to the 
jury'."). 
Curiously, Coleman never even mentions these standards nor provides any argument as 
to why they do not apply, but argues only the review standard applicable for the refusal to give a 
jury instruction and claims the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion. Contrary to Coleman's 
argument, even applying the jury instruction review standard, the Trial Court abused its 
discretion. "A requested jury instruction must be given ifit is supported by any reasonable 
view of the evidence, Bailey, 139 Idaho at 750, 86 P.3d at 464, but the detennination of whether 
the instruction is so supported is committed to the discretion of the district court." Craig Johnson 
v. Floyd Town Architects, 142 Idaho 797,800, 134 P.3d 648,651 (2006). Based on the facts 
cited to in the Appellants' Brief, Street Search identified substantial facts to support its fraud and 
constructive fraud claims, "by any reasonable view of the evidence." 
Again, the Trial Court believed it was entitled to dismiss a claim by weighing evidence 
and refusing to give ajury instruction based on the Trial Court's interpretation of the evidence, 
which is plain error. 
V. The Trial Court Abused its Discretion When it Refused to Give the Promissory Estoppel 
Jury Instruction 
Coleman relies on a single case, Lettunich v. Key Bank Nat. Ass'n, 141 Idaho 362, 109 
P.3d 1104, (2005), in response to Street Search's argument, and suggests that case is 
"instructive." Recently, however, the Supreme Court reiterated the foundational issue in the 
Lettunich case was application of the statute of frauds, "This Court noted that because the 
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promise did not comply with the Statute of Frauds, 'there was no complete promise ... to be 
enforced: Id." Bank of Commerce v. Jefferson Enters., LLC, Doc. No. 40043, p. 15. 
(June 20, 20l3) Coleman fails to raise any argument that the statute offrauds applies in this 
case, so Lettunich is distinguishable. 
Moreover, the Lettunich decision was based on the finding the Plaintiffs had failed to 
establish an enforceable contract. 
For example, there is no indication of the amount of the loan, the interest rate, the 
disbursement schedule, the terms of repayment, the security for the loan, or the 
parties' rights after default. While none of these terms individually may be 
determinative, the lack of all of them in this case makes the oral agreement to lend 
money vague, incomplete and unenforceable. 
Lettunich v. Key Bank Nat. Ass/n, 141 Idaho 362,368, 109 P.3d 1104, 1110 (2005). 
For Street Search to have been entitled to a jury instruction on Promissory Estoppel it 
would have had to present evidence establishing the terms of an enforceable contract. However, 
Coleman concedes Street Search met this burden in his Brief. "Here the parties presented 
differing material terms of an alleged agreement. The jury concluded no contract existed." 
(Respondents' Brief, p. 39.) Coleman argues the jury concluded there was no meeting of the 
minds, not that Street Search failed to present tenns sufficient to establish an enforceable 
contract. As Street Search established the requisite material terms of its contract, then it was 
entitled to a jury instruction on Promissory Estoppel. 
Coleman focuses his argument entirely on the Lettunich case, and offers no argument that 
Street Search failed to establish the requisite elements of Promissory Estoppel. Consequently 
Coleman has waived any argument to the contrary. 
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VI. The Trial Court Erred When it Refused to Allow Street Search to Present Evidence of 
its Tort Damages 
While Coleman argues Street Search somehow erred by not appealing the "verdict," it 
ignores the fact that if the Court grants Street Search's appeal on any issue raised, Street Search 
is entitled to a new trial, assuming that is, ifIdaho has jurisdiction. Accordingly, Street Search 
has raised this issue and contends whether the Trial Court erred should be addressed on appeal so 
the same error is not made again below, if the Court grants a new trial. Coleman does not argue 
against the substance of this issue, he simply cites once again to City qfMeridian, and claims the 
Court should disregard this issue. 
The Trial Court gave a jury instruction regarding the "tort" of breach of fiduciary duty. 
Consequently, Street Search should have been allowed to prove its "tort" damages at trial. 
Unfortunately, and the record is undisputed, the Trial Court refused to allow Street Search to 
prove such damages. On remand, Street Search respectfully requests that this Court direct the 
Trial Court to allow proof of Street Search's tort damages when the Court instructs the Jury on 
Street Search's tort claims. 
VII. Coleman's "Objection" to the Appellants' Request for Attorney Fees on Appeal is 
Nonsensical 
First, Colman fails to identify how the Trial Court's ruling awarding attorney fees to 
Coleman, although having deducted a substantial amount after finding Coleman's counsel acted 
unreasonably and without foundation, has any relevance to Street Search's request for Attorney 
Fees on Appeal. 
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Moreover, Coleman's argument is premised on the supposition that Podesta and Street 
Search have not prevailed on appeal. However, it would seem logical to argue in opposition to a 
request for an award of attorney fees that should the requesting party prevail then they still are 
not entitled to attorney fees or costs for some reason? 
Coleman nevertheless fails to argue any basis for the Court not to award attorney fees and 
costs to Podesta and Street Search if they prevail. Accordingly, Coleman has waived any 
objection to the insufficiency of Podesta and Street Search's request for attorney fees if Podesta 
and Street Search are the prevailing party on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the facts and arguments identified and presented in the Appellants' Brief and 
herein, the Appellants respectfully request this Court reverse the Trial Court and find that 
asserting personal jurisdiction over either Podesta or Street Search in Idaho was error. Coleman 
filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a ruling there was no contract with Podesta or Street 
Search. It is therefore nonsensical arguing on the one hand there was no contract, thereby 
contending nothing Podesta did while in Idaho for 24 hours gave rise to any contractual 
relationship, while on the other hand arguing the Court should exercise personal jurisdiction over 
Podesta in Idaho related to a contract that does not exist. 
Additionally, Coleman failed to identify anything Podesta did during his single 24 hour 
visit to Idaho that gave rise to any cause of action; therefore Idaho's long arm statute does not 
apply. Moreover, Coleman has failed to establish jurisdiction in Idaho "comports" with due 
process. The undisputed facts confirm Podesta was in Idaho for a single day in 2009 at 
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Coleman"s request and based on Coleman"s promise of equity interest in a limited partnership. 
Podesta and Street Search therefore respectfully request this Court reverse the Trial Court and 
remand for dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction. 
Alternatively, the Appellants request this Court grant the Appellants a new trial based on 
evidentiary errors resulting in the exclusion of relevant and material evidence, based on the Tlial 
Court's error dismissing the Appellants' fraud and constructive fraud claims, based upon the 
Respondents' fraud and misconduct, and based upon the failure to give a promissory estoppel 
jury instruction. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 8th day of October, 2013. 
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS 
For the Appellants 
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